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Supreme Court should have refrained from the exercise of its dis-
cretionary power in the present case. Upon an appeal from a convic-
tion, the court would then be compelled to consider the admissibility
of such evidence in a proceeding to which a state would be a party,
thereby confronting the Court directly with the problem of federal-
state relations.
Linza B. Inabnit
TORTS-INTENTIONAL-WRoNGFUL DEATH BY LiQuo-Administratrix of
one whose death was caused by drinking a bottle of whiskey sued the
vendor of the whiskey under the wrongful death statute.' The com-
plaint alleged that defendant, while acting within the scope of his
employment as a clerk of a co-defendant, a licensed retailer of pack-
aged liquor, sold the deceased a quart of whiskey for the purpose of
injuring him, knowing him to be intoxicated at the time;2 that the
defendant knew that the deceased bad bet with another person that
he, the deceased, could drink the quart of whiskey without stopping;
that defendant knew that it was for the purpose of settling the bet
that the deceased bought the whiskey and knew that he intended to
drink all of it without stopping; that defendant should have known
that the deceased could not safely be trusted with the whiskey but
that he sold it to him anyway for the purpose of injuring him. The
trial court dismissed the complaint on the ground that it did not state
a claim on which relief could be granted.3 Held: Reversed. The Court
of Appeals held that the administratrix of one killed by drinking an
excessive quantity of whiskey can maintain an action against the
vendor who sold the whiskey to deceased for the purpose of injuring
him. Nally v. Blandford, 291 S.W. 2d 832 (Ky. 1956).
The decision was based primarily on statements made in Brittol's
Adner. v. Samuels.4 In that case the defendant, knowing plaintiff's in-
testate was an inebriate and intoxicated at the time, sold him whiskey
I Ky. Rev. Stat. 411.130 (hereinafter cited as K.R.S.)
2 The sale of whiskey to a person actually or apparently intoxicated is a viola-
tion of K.R.S. 244.080. In Tate v. Borton, 272 S.W. 2d 333 (Ky. 1954) "intoxica-
tion" is defined as being under the influence of alcohol to such an extent that the
physical and mental faculties are affected and the judgment impaired. This may
be something less than "drunkenness" which the court said is excessive intoxication
but does not necessarily mean stupefaction or helplessness.
3 Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure, 8.01. Of these rules Commissioner
Stanley recently said:
"But the simplification and liberality extend to the manner of stating
a case and are not so great as to obviate the necessity of stating the
elements of a cause of action or defense, as the case may be."
4 143 Ky. 129, 136 S.W. 143 (1911).
Johnson v. Coleman, 288 S.W. 2d 348, 349 (Ky. 1956).
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in violation of local option laws. Plaintiffs intestate died from the
effect of the whiskey. The court held that:
The unlawful or wrongful act was the sale of the liquor,
but death was produced, not by the sale, but by the drinking thereof
by deceased. The proximate cause of the death, therefore, was not
the wrongful or unlawful act complained of. 5
But after thus stating the holding of that case, the court, by way of
qualification, said that,
* * * in the absence of an allegation that the sale was
made for the purpose of injuring him, or with the knowledge that he
intended to drink of it to such an extent as to produce injury or death,
or that he had reasonable grounds to believe that deceased could not
be safely trusted with the whiskey it cannot be charged that the act
of making the sale to deceased was wrongful in the sense in which
the word is used in the statute under consideration. .. 6
This was all that was said on the subject. No reasons were given for
these qualifying remarks and no authorities were cited. But it was
upon this dictum that the court relied in reaching the result in the
principal case. Closer examination of the statement reveals that such
was not the law, but that the principle and policy of the law are to the
contrary.
The Wrongful Death Statute7 makes available two theories of
recovery, namely, negligence and intentional tort. It is settled that the
representative's claim is subject to the same defenses which could have
been asserted against deceased had he brought the action, 8 hence, it is
clear that the first theory of recovery was not available to this plaintiff
for the contributory negligence of deceased would bar recovery.9
The alternative theory, that defendant committed an intentional
tort, was the one relied on by plaintiff. An elementary prerequisite to
any tort liability is an injury to the party suing.10 The word "injury"
5 Id. at 129, 136 S.W. at 144 (1911).
6 Ibid.
7 Supra note 1.
8 Apparently this is what the court meant when it said that the plaintiff has
the "same cause of action the deceased would have." See Perry's Adm r. v. Louis-
ville & N. R. Co., 199 Ky. 396, 251 S.W. 202 (1932); Harralson v. Thomas, 269
S.W. 2d 276 (Ky. 1954); but see Louisville Ry. Co. v. Raymond's Adm'r., 135
Ky. 738, 123 S.W. 281 (1909), wherein the court points out that there are
actually two causes of action, one, accruing at the time of the injury and which
existed at common law, being made to survive by statute, and another, accruing
at the time of the death and which did not exist at common law but was created
by statute.
9 Exposing oneself unreasonably to an obvious hazard is contributory negli-
gence. Crouch v. Noland, 238 Ky. 575, 38 S.W. 2d 471 (1931). Contributory
negligence is a complete bar in Kentucky to an action based on negligence. Nor-
folk & W. Ry. Co. v. Bailey, 307 Ky. 386, 211 S.W. 2d 154 (1948). An intoxicated
person is held to the same degree of care as a sober person. Louisville & N. R. Co.
v. Hyde, 239 S.W. 2d 936 (Ky. 1951).10 Restatement, Torts, Sec. 5.
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is defined in terms of its legal consequences; that is, it denotes the in-
vasion of a legally protected interest of another." The question then
is what legally protected interest of the deceased did the defendant
invade?
There are two groups of cases which are of interest on this point.
The first are those wherein the courts have consistently refused to
protect persons from their own folly. Even in cases decided under
the so-called "dramshop" or "civil damage" statutes12 in force in other
jurisdictions the courts hold that one who brings about his own in-
toxication does not have any cause of action against the one furnish-
ing the liquor. Buntin v. Hutton'3 was such a case. It was there held
that where the person suing voluntarily purchases liquor, or procures
another to purchase it, neither the common law nor the dramshop act
gives him a right of action against the person furnishing the liquor to
recover damages for the harm suffered from drinking the whiskey. To
hold otherwise would savor too much of letting a person benefit by his
own wrongful act. Similarly, the Alabama court in King v. Henkie
14
held that where the defendant sold liquor illegally to one helplessly
drunk at the time and whose death ensued almost immediately from
his drinking of the whiskey, the cause of the death was the drinking of
the whiskey and not the sale, and, hence, no right of action existed in
favor of the personal representative. In the first of these two cases the
court did not once refer to consent or contributory negligence, and
in the second that court even went so far as to expressly state that
their decision was independent of any question of contributory negli-
gence. Obviously, if the courts had decided that there was a legal
injury then the question of contributory negligence or consent could
not have been thrust aside in this manner.
The second group of cases is very limited. It consists of two cases
arising under circumstances somewhat similar to the principal case
and in which the respective courts did find a legal injury. The interest
which was recognized and protected was the interest that one, whose
11 Id., Sec. 7.
12 M1. Rev. Stat., c. 43. Sec. 135. This statute provides in part that
"Every person, who shall be injured, in person or property by an in-
toxicated person, shall have a right of action in his or her own name
• .. against any person or persons who shall, by selling or giving
alcoholic liquor, have caused the intoxication, in whole or in part of
such person ... .
In Danhof v. Osborne, 10 Ill. App. 2d 529, 135 N.E. 2d 492 at 502 (1956) the
court applied the cases arising under the Dram Shop Act to this statute.
13206 Ill. App. 194 (1917).
14 80 Ala. 505, 60 Am. Rep. 119 (1886). The court very ably discussses the
question of causation in deaths resulting from excessive drindng of intoxicating
liquor.
[Vol. 46,
RiEcENr CAsEs
physical or mental faculties are impaired and whose resistance to force
or persuasion is reduced or completely lacking, has in being free from
inducement, persuasion, or coercion to do an act harmful to himself
which he would not do if his faculties were not impaired. Thus, in
McCue v. Klein' where the last of three pints of whiskey, consumed
by deceased in quick succession, was actually administered to him by
defendants, after deceased lost all self control and was helplessly
drunk, the court held that the inducement and force thus directed
against the deceased was an invasion of a legally protected interest
and allowed deceased's representative to recover. In Ibach v. Jackson'G
the Oregon court held that the complaint stated a cause of action only
after it was amended to include an allegation that the defendant
forced the deceased to drink liquor and continued to do so after she
lost her sense of volition and reason.
No case has been found holding that the sale of whiskey to an
intoxicated person subjected the vendor to liability for any harm re-
sulting to the purchaser who voluntarily drank it in excessive quanti-
ties. On the contrary, the courts have consistently held that the
voluntary act of drinking the whiskey was the cause of any harm
which resulted to the consumer. The only cases found wherein a per-
son harmed by excessive indulgence in liquor has been given an action
against the one furnishing the whiskey are McCue v. Klein and Ibach
v. Jackson, supra. In neither of those cases was the sale sufficient to
raise the liability. Those cases were based on the fact that the act of
drinking was involuntary. It cannot be said that the act of the de-
ceased in the present case was not voluntary. A voluntary act has been
defined as "One that proceeds from one's own free will; done by one's
choice, or one's own accord, unconstrained by external interference,
force or influence and not prompted or suggested by another." 7
In the principal case the allegations clearly indicate that the drink-
ing of the whiskey was neither prompted nor suggested by the de-
fendant. No act of interference, force or influence is alleged against
the vendor either in soliciting the sale or the drinking. On the con-
trary the complaint alleges that the whiskey was bought for a purpose
which the deceased had formed as a result of a bet. With this fixed
purpose in mind and already committed to the plan to drink the
whiskey without stopping, the deceased bought it. It is implicit in this
set of facts that the deceased initiated the sale. The vendor sold the
15 60 Tex. 168, 48 Am. Rep. 260 (1883).
16 148 Ore. 92, 35 P. 2d 672 (1934).
17 Brown v. McCulloch, 24 Tenn. App. 324, 144 S.W. 2d 1, 4 (1940), quoting
67 C.J. 274. See also Coker v. State, 199 Ga. 20, 33 S.E. 2d 171 (1945).
KENTucxY LAW JouiRNAVo. 6
whiskey to him, but the purchase and the drinking were not in re-
sponse to any purpose which the vendor had, however bad. Both
acts were motivated by the purposes of the deceased; both acts were
done in fulfillment of those purposes and both acts were voluntary acts
of the deceased. The complaint alleges that the defendant sold the
whiskey to the deceased for the purpose of injuring him, but it states
additional facts clearly showing that neither the purchase nor the
drinking of the whiskey was in response to that purpose.
The conclusion to which this leads is that the defendant in the
present case invaded no interest of the deceased which the common
law has previously seen fit to recognize and protect. The courts in
other jurisdictions, when confronted with the question have dealt
with it as such a drastic change in the existing common law that they
have left the choice of policy to the legislatures. The legislatures,
however, have not seen fit to extend protection to the purchaser or
even to one whom he injures if the injured party contributed to the
intoxication of the person injuring him.1s They have restricted their
protection to innocent third parties. Our legislature has not even gone
this far, as was pointed out in the principal case. But the Court of
Appeals of Kentucky chose to follow the dictum in the Britton case,
completely overlooking, it would seem, that it is neither sound in
principle nor just to permit a person to profit by his own voluntary
drinking of an excessive quantity of whiskey. In holding as it did the
court established a liability far exceeding even that of the dramshop
or civil damage statutes.
In the case of Britton's Adirdr. v. Samuels the court in distinguish-
ing that case from two previous ones, said:
These are the only authorities in this State in which this
question [what acts were covered by the wrongful death statute] has
been raised. In each case the negligence or wrongful act which was
made the basis of the suit was one committed against the person of
i o to Use of Lenand v. Linck, 71 Ill. App. 358, 359 (1877):
"The party complani"ng and seeking damage must be free from com-
plicity in procuring the intoxication. Such appears to be the view of
the courts of last resort in this State, Iowa, and Michigan, although
in none of the reported cases were the facts the same as in this case.
In each of those cases the complaining party was seeking damages
for injuries caused by the intoxication of another. Reget v. Bell, 77 Ill.
593; Hays v. Waite, 36 Ill. App. 397; Engleken v. Helger, 43 Iowa
563; Rosecrants v. Shoemaker, 60 Mich. 4.
"In Iowa and Michigan, where the statutes giving a right of action to
persons injured by reason of the intoxication of another are similar
to ours, it is held that the wife cannot recover damages from a
saloon keeper who has caused the intoxication of her husband, if she
herself encouraged or requested the sale of the liquor to her husband.
Such holdings were based upon the grounds that she was not an in-
nocent injured party.
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deceased. In one case he was shot and in the other improperly
treated. The case under consideration is analogous to neither. Here
the wrongful act complained of was the violation of the liquor law.
It was not the commission of any wrongful act toward the person of
the deceased, or the neglect or failure to discharge any duty which
the defendant owed him. (Italics supplied)19
It would seem that the same could be said of the defendants act in
the present case since in both cases the act was an illegal sale of
whiskey. In the absence of an allegation of some act which could be
said to be directed against the person of the deceased or that the
defendant used duress, deception, or arts of persuasion to induce the
drinking of the liquor the complaint did not state a claim upon which
relief could be granted by previously existing standards.
James H. Byrdwell
TOmTS-LANDowNER's LrkaTY ToO R sPASSING Cnar.mR-Plaintiff, a
two and one-half year old boy, sustained injuries when he was run
over by a tank car after he had followed his dog into defendant rail-
road's switchyard. Plaintiff lived adjacent to the switchyard on a
street which dead-ended at the yard. Approximately thirty-five to
forty children lived on this street. There was no fence or barrier
of any kind between it and the switchyard, but defendant had erected
a no-trespassing sign at the end of the street and had three patrolmen
on duty at all times who inspected the cars and chased children from
the property when they saw them. Defendant had knowledge of both
child and adult trespassers, but denied that these trespassers crossed
the tracks. Plaintiff's evidence showed that in order to avoid going
several blocks around the yard, pedestrians often used a path across
the yards as a shortcut. The Circuit Court gave a directed verdict for
the defendant. Held: Reversed. The court said that the case should have
been submitted to the jury with an instruction which regarded the
switchyard as an inherent peril to the young child, as a matter of law,
and which allowed the jury to determine the issues of (1) whether
the child's presence could have been anticipated, (2) whether de-
fendant was negligent in failing to take reasonable precautions to
prevent tle child's entry, and (8) whether this negligence was the
cause of the injury. Mann v. Kentucky & Indiana Railroad Company,
290 S.W. 2d 820 (Ky. 1955). 1
19 Supra note 5 at 132, 136 S.W. at 144.
' At the subsequent trial in Jefferson Circuit Court in November, 1956, the
plaintiff was awarded $175,000 damages for the loss of his leg at the hip and arm
at the shoulder.
